Pereida v. Wilkinson
Case Overview
The Supreme Court resolved a critical question about which immigration crimes disqualify a noncitizen from 'cancellation of removal' (a form of relief requiring ten years of continuous presence and good moral character) addressing whether the definition of 'crime involving moral turpitude' requires a categorical analysis based on the minimum conduct that the statute of conviction covers, with major consequences for long-term residents facing deportation.
Decision
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Opinion of the Court
The Facts
Clemente Pereida, a Mexican citizen who had lived in the United States since 1995, sought cancellation of removal - a form of discretionary relief available to certain long-term residents. To be eligible, he could not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. He was convicted under a Nebraska statute criminalizing both fraudulent acts and some innocent acts like dishonored checks. The Board of Immigration Appeals found he was ineligible without determining which specific act he had committed, relying on the fact that some violations of the statute qualify as CMITs.
The Application
Applying the categorical approach to Pereida's conviction under the Nebraska statute, the Court examined what minimum conduct the statute criminalizes rather than what Pereida actually did. Because the statute covers both fraudulent acts (which can constitute crimes involving moral turpitude) and innocent conduct like dishonored checks, the statute is divisible - but the record of conviction did not reveal which offense Pereida was convicted under. Without clarity from the record of conviction about which branch of the divisible statute applied to his conviction, Pereida could not affirmatively demonstrate that his conviction was not for a CIMT, leaving him unable to satisfy his burden of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal.
The Conclusion
**Decided March 4, 2021. The Court held 5-3 that under the categorical approach, when a statute of conviction criminalizes both CMITs and innocent conduct, and the record of conviction does not clarify which offense was committed, the immigrant has not met the burden of showing eligibility for cancellation of removal.** Pereida bore the burden of establishing eligibility, and his failure to show the conviction was not a CIMT meant he could not obtain relief. The ruling significantly limited cancellation of removal for many long-term immigrants.
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Case Analysis
Overview
The Supreme Court resolved a critical question about which immigration crimes disqualify a noncitizen from 'cancellation of removal'. A form of relief requiring ten years of continuous presence and good moral character. Addressing whether the definition of 'crime involving moral turpitude' requires a categorical analysis based on the minimum conduct that the statute of conviction covers, with major consequences for long-term residents facing deportation.
Facts
Clemente Pereida, a Mexican citizen who had lived in the United States since 1995, sought cancellation of removal. A form of discretionary relief available to certain long-term residents. To be eligible, he could not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. He was convicted under a Nebraska statute criminalizing both fraudulent acts and some innocent acts like dishonored checks. The Board of Immigration Appeals found he was ineligible without determining which specific act he had committed, relying on the fact that some violations of the statute qualify as CMITs.
Issue
Whether an immigrant seeking cancellation of removal must affirmatively show that a prior conviction was not for a crime involving moral turpitude, or whether the government bears the burden of proving the conviction qualifies as a CIMT. And whether courts use a categorical approach requiring clarity about the minimum conduct covered by the statute of conviction.
Rule
The categorical approach requires courts to examine the elements of the statute of conviction rather than the actual underlying conduct. Taylor v. United States (1990) and Mathis v. United States (2016) established how to identify the elements of a statute for categorical analysis. For 'divisible' statutes with multiple distinct crimes, courts apply the 'modified categorical approach' and may consult the record of conviction to determine which offense of conviction applies.
Analysis
Applying the categorical approach to Pereida's conviction under the Nebraska statute, the Court examined what minimum conduct the statute criminalizes rather than what Pereida actually did. Because the statute covers both fraudulent acts (which can constitute crimes involving moral turpitude) and innocent conduct like dishonored checks, the statute is divisible. But the record of conviction did not reveal which offense Pereida was convicted under. Without clarity from the record of conviction about which branch of the divisible statute applied to his conviction, Pereida could not affirmatively demonstrate that his conviction was not for a CIMT, leaving him unable to satisfy his burden of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal.
Conclusion
**Decided March 4, 2021. The Court held 5-3 that under the categorical approach, when a statute of conviction criminalizes both CMITs and innocent conduct, and the record of conviction does not clarify which offense was committed, the immigrant has not met the burden of showing eligibility for cancellation of removal.** Pereida bore the burden of establishing eligibility, and his failure to show the conviction was not a CIMT meant he could not obtain relief. The ruling significantly limited cancellation of removal for many long-term immigrants.
Notes
OT2020. Added via SCOTUS bulk import 2026-05-14
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