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Blanche v. Lau

No. 25-429 SCOTUS · Decided Decided SCOTUS
Cert Granted: Jan 9, 2026 Argued: Apr 22, 2026 Decided: Jun 23, 2026
📄 Read the Opinion

Decision

Opinion Thomas, J.
Dissent Jackson, J. (Sotomayor, Kagan, JJ., joining)

Opinion of the Court

Thomas, J.

The Facts

Muk Choi Lau, a lawful permanent resident from China admitted in 2007, was charged with third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey in 2012. On returning from a trip abroad, DHS paroled him into the country pending resolution of the charges rather than admitting him, treating him as an applicant for admission subject to inadmissibility grounds. Lau challenged the government's authority to parole and seek removal of an LPR returning from a brief trip on these grounds.

The Issue

Whether a lawful permanent resident returning from a brief trip abroad is 'seeking admission' and thus subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) grounds of inadmissibility; and what evidence standard applies when the government seeks to parole or remove an LPR upon reentry.

The Rules

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) INA § 212 - grounds of inadmissibility

Aliens shall be inadmissible if they have committed crimes of moral turpitude; applies to those 'seeking admission.'

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) INA § 101(a)(13)(C) - LPR deemed seeking admission

A returning LPR is not seeking admission unless, inter alia, they have been absent for more than 180 days, engaged in illegal activity, or departed under proceedings.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) INA § 212(d)(5) - parole authority

The Attorney General may parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.

The Application

The Government's Position

The government argues that under IIRIRA, a lawful permanent resident returning from abroad is 'seeking admission' and therefore subject to inadmissibility grounds under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). DHS can deny readmission based on criminal conduct, using the evidence standards applicable to inadmissibility determinations rather than criminal conviction requirements.

Lau's Position

Lau argues a lawful permanent resident returning from a brief, innocent trip should not be treated as 'seeking admission' subject to criminal inadmissibility grounds without a conviction. Treating brief departures as new admissions exposes millions of LPRs to removal without the procedural protections that attend deportation proceedings for residents.

At the Supreme Court

Argued April 22, 2026. The case asks whether routine travel by green card holders can trigger inadmissibility review - a question affecting millions of lawful permanent residents who travel internationally. The ruling will define the boundary between the government's admission power and the settled expectations of LPRs returning from brief trips.

The Conclusion

The Court held 6-3 that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not require border officers to have clear and convincing evidence before making certain removal or inadmissibility determinations. The decision reduces the evidentiary burden on the government in immigration enforcement proceedings at the border.

Court -
FiledOct 8, 2025
CL Statusactive
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No circuit court data for this case.

Cert GrantedJan 9, 2026
Statusactive
Filed (CL)Oct 8, 2025
View on CourtListener →

Case Analysis

Overview

The court will decide whether the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident committed a crime before treating them as an alien seeking admission. A distinction that determines whether they can be deported on inadmissibility grounds.

Facts

Muk Choi Lau, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) from China admitted in 2007, was charged with third-degree trademark counterfeiting in New Jersey in 2012. On returning from a trip abroad, DHS paroled him into the country pending resolution of the charges rather than admitting him, treating him as an applicant for admission subject to inadmissibility grounds because he was charged with a “crime involving moral turpitude.” Lau challenged the government's authority to parole and seek removal of an LPR returning from a brief trip on these grounds.

Issue

Whether a lawful permanent resident (LPR) returning from a brief trip abroad is 'seeking admission' and thus subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) grounds of inadmissibility; and what evidence standard applies when the government seeks to parole or remove an LPR upon reentry.

Rule

Aliens shall be inadmissible if they have committed crimes of moral turpitude; applies to those 'seeking admission.'

Rule

A returning LPR is not seeking admission unless, inter alia, they have been absent for more than 180 days, engaged in illegal activity, or departed under proceedings.

Rule

The Attorney General may parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.

The Government's Position

The government argues that under IIRIRA, a lawful permanent resident returning from abroad is 'seeking admission' and therefore subject to inadmissibility grounds under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). DHS can deny readmission based on criminal conduct, using the evidence standards applicable to inadmissibility determinations rather than criminal conviction requirements.

Lau's Position

Lau argues a lawful permanent resident returning from a brief, innocent trip should not be treated as 'seeking admission' subject to criminal inadmissibility grounds without a conviction. Treating brief departures as new admissions exposes millions of LPRs to removal without the procedural protections that attend deportation proceedings for residents.

At the Supreme Court

Argued April 22, 2026. The case asks whether routine travel by green card holders can trigger inadmissibility review. A question affecting millions of lawful permanent residents who travel internationally. The ruling will define the boundary between the government's admission power and the settled expectations of LPRs returning from brief trips.

Conclusion

The Court held 6-3 that the Immigration and Nationality Act does not require border officers to have clear and convincing evidence before making certain removal or inadmissibility determinations. But because Lau argues that his case did not involve moral turpitude and that wasn’t an issue in this case, the court sent the case back to the second circuit to decide that issue.

Notes

Argued 2026-04-22. Added via SCOTUS OT2025 intake 2026-05-13.

Jackson’s Dissent

With today’s decision, the Court allows the Government to return an LPR to the status of “seeking an admission” upon his entry at the border, so long as the Government is able to show later that he was eventually convicted. That sequencing undermines the plain terms and basic operation of the relevant statutory scheme, which guarantees that LPRs will not be “regarded as seek-ing an admission” at the border.

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