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Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee

No. 19-1257 SCOTUS · Decided SCOTUS
Argued: Mar 2, 2021 Decided: Jul 1, 2021


The Law · How the Case Works

Overview

Overview

Arizona's policy of discarding ballots cast in the wrong precinct and its ban on third-party collection of mail ballots were challenged under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as disproportionately burdening minority voters. The Supreme Court upheld both provisions 6-3, articulating a new multi-factor framework that significantly narrows the reach of Section 2 results-test challenges to facially neutral voting rules.

The Facts

Facts

Arizona discarded any ballot cast outside a voter's assigned precinct and made it a crime for anyone other than the voter, a family member, or an official mail handler to collect and submit another person's mail-in ballot. The DNC challenged both provisions, presenting statistical evidence that they fell more heavily on Black, Hispanic, and Native American voters. The Ninth Circuit ruled both provisions violated Section 2.

The Issue

Issue

Whether Arizona's out-of-precinct ballot policy and third-party ballot collection ban violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by imposing a discriminatory burden on minority voters' ability to participate in the political process, and whether HB 2023 was enacted with discriminatory purpose.

The Rules

Rule

Section 2 prohibits voting practices that result in minority voters having less opportunity than other voters to participate in the political process. Disparate racial impact alone is insufficient; courts must assess the totality of circumstances, including the size of the burden relative to the burden on other voters, the state's interest in the rule, the general course of voting administration in the state, and historical patterns of discrimination. Facially neutral laws that impose only modest disparate burdens generally survive Section 2 scrutiny.

The Application

Analysis

The Court applied Section 2's totality of circumstances test to determine whether Arizona's facially neutral policies imposed unlawful discriminatory burdens on minority voters. Although statistical evidence demonstrated that the out-of-precinct ballot discard policy and third-party ballot collection ban fell more heavily on Black, Hispanic, and Native American voters, the Court found these disparate impacts insufficient to constitute a Section 2 violation when weighed against Arizona's legitimate interests in ballot integrity and administrative accuracy. The Court's framework effectively narrowed Section 2 by holding that disparate racial impact alone, even when statistically documented, does not establish a violation unless the challenged rule creates a substantial and unjustified impediment to minority electoral participation relative to the overall voting scheme.

The Conclusion

Conclusion

The Supreme Court upheld both Arizona provisions 6-3, finding the disparate burdens they imposed did not rise to the level of a Section 2 violation under the totality of circumstances. The Ninth Circuit's finding of discriminatory purpose as to the ballot collection ban was also reversed.

The Record · 1 original document
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
FiledMar 11, 2019
CL Statusterminated
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No circuit court data for this case.

Cert Granted -
Statusterminated
Filed (CL)Mar 11, 2019
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Outcome History (1)

  1. Jan 9, 2020 Circuit
    Affirmed Relief denied Final Unreviewed

    The appellate court affirmed the judgment from the district court.

SCOTUS TMR-ed24b527 Jul 28, 2026

Related Cases (4)

direct precedent
  • Brown v. Board of Education
    The opinion does not actually cite Brown v. Board of Education in the provided excerpt; the footnotes reference cases with "Brown" in the title but they concern voting discrimination, not the school desegregation principle from Brown v. Board of Education.
  • Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
    The opinion cites Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project for the legal principle that statutory provisions should be interpreted according to their text and ordinary meaning.
  • Miranda v. Arizona
    The opinion cites Miranda v. Arizona for the legal principle that courts should be cautious about announcing broad tests that would govern all cases of a particular type.
  • Texas v. Johnson
    Texas v. Johnson is cited for the legal principle that courts apply consistent interpretive standards when evaluating statutory language and constitutional protections.
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