Calcutt v. FDIC
Overview
Overview
Calcutt, a former bank officer, challenged the FDIC's authority to remove him and prohibit him from working in the banking industry. The Supreme Court held per curiam that the Sixth Circuit applied the wrong standard of review by substituting its judgment for the agency's on factual findings, and remanded for application of the proper substantial evidence standard.
The Facts
Facts
The FDIC issued an order removing William Calcutt from his position as a bank officer and prohibiting him from future banking industry participation, finding he had violated laws and regulations and engaged in unsafe banking practices. The Sixth Circuit reviewed the FDIC's factual findings de novo rather than under the deferential substantial evidence standard applicable to agency adjudications.
The Issue
Issue
Whether a court of appeals reviewing a federal banking agency's removal order must apply the substantial evidence standard to the agency's factual findings, or whether the court may conduct de novo review of those findings.
The Rules
Rule
Under the substantial evidence standard, courts must uphold an agency's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, even if the court would have reached a different factual conclusion. Courts may not substitute their judgment for the agency's on contested factual questions in formal agency adjudications.
The Application
Analysis
The Sixth Circuit erred by conducting de novo review of the FDIC's factual findings that Calcutt violated banking laws and engaged in unsafe practices; under the substantial evidence standard, the court was required to defer to the FDIC's findings if they were supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record, regardless of whether the court might have reached a different conclusion based on the same evidence. The FDIC, as the agency charged with banking regulation and supervision, was entitled to have its factual determinations reviewed deferentially rather than substituting the court's judgment about what the evidence showed. By remanding for application of the proper standard, the Supreme Court required the Sixth Circuit to examine whether substantial evidence supported the FDIC's removal order on the record before it. A more limited review that respects the agency's institutional expertise and role in banking enforcement.
The Conclusion
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and ordered the case sent back to the FDIC. The Court applied the ordinary remand rule of SEC v. Chenery, which holds that a reviewing court may uphold an agency's action only on the grounds the agency itself relied on. Because the Sixth Circuit had identified two legal errors by the FDIC but then affirmed the sanctions on its own reasoning instead of remanding, it exceeded its role. The proper course was to return the matter to the agency so the FDIC could reconsider Calcutt's case under the correct legal standards.
Flag an issue
This tracker is maintained by BrynoDC and is free because readers fund it. Support