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Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate

No. 21-12 SCOTUS · Decided SCOTUS
Argued: Jan 19, 2022 Decided: May 16, 2022


The Law · How the Case Works

Overview

Overview

The Supreme Court held 6-3 that the federal limit on the amount candidates may repay from post-election contributions on personal loans made to their campaigns violates the First Amendment. Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority, striking down 52 U.S.C. Section 30116(j) as an unconstitutional restriction on political speech.

The Facts

Facts

Senator Ted Cruz loaned his 2018 Senate campaign $260,000 shortly before Election Day, exceeding the $250,000 statutory cap on post-election repayment of candidate loans from campaign contributions. After the election, the campaign sought to repay the full amount but the FEC's anti-corruption provision capped repayment at $250,000. Cruz challenged the provision as an unconstitutional burden on his campaign speech rights.

The Issue

Issue

Whether 52 U.S.C. Section 30116(j), which limits the repayment of candidate personal loans from post-election contributions to $250,000, violates the First Amendment's protection of political speech and association.

The Rules

Rule

The First Amendment protects political contributions and expenditures from government restriction unless the restriction is narrowly tailored to prevent quid pro quo corruption. Limits on the ability to repay loans burden the candidate's incentive to loan money to his own campaign, affecting political speech.

The Application

Analysis

The repayment cap imposed a direct burden on Cruz's campaign speech by discouraging him from making personal loans. A financial mechanism to fund his own campaign. Under First Amendment doctrine, this burden requires justification by a compelling government interest, specifically preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The Court found that post-election repayments of candidate loans present no realistic risk of quid pro quo corruption, since the loan transaction occurs between the candidate and his own campaign rather than between the candidate and outside donors, and any post-election repayment occurs after the electoral benefit has been realized. Therefore, the cap could not survive strict scrutiny and had to be struck down as an unconstitutional restriction on political speech.

The Conclusion

Conclusion

The ruling strikes down a campaign finance provision designed to prevent corruption by limiting the financial return candidates could receive from post-election fundraising. The majority found insufficient evidence that post-election repayments of candidate loans create a meaningful risk of corruption.

The Record · 1 original document
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
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SCOTUS TMR-62e11235 Jul 28, 2026

Related Cases (4)

direct precedent
  • Twining v. New Jersey
    The opinion cites Twining v. New Jersey for the legal principle that a party's voluntary subjection to a regulatory scheme does not eliminate their standing to challenge the constitutionality of that scheme's enforcement.
  • Nixon v. United States
    The case cites Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC for the principle that courts should not defer to Congress when legislation appears designed to protect incumbents from electoral competition.
  • Citizens United v. FEC
    It cites Citizens United for the principle that the First Amendment prohibits government attempts to equalize electoral resources or limit a contributor's influence over elected officials.
  • Buckley v. Valeo
    The active case cites Buckley v. Valeo as relevant authority.
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